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The tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean are 
the largest and most valuable in the world. Despite being endowed 
with such resources, the 14 Pacific island countries in this region (such 
as the Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu)1 have not been able to maximise their use for economic 
development, and are now confronted with their impending depletion. 
This Development Viewpoint explores the factors behind these trends 
(see Havice and Campling, 2010). One of its main objectives is to 
counter the dominant neoliberal ‘good governance’ discourse that 
places the central blame on the governments of these small countries 
for mismanaging and squandering their fishing resources. 
The reality is that such states’ sovereignty, and thus control, over 
fisheries resources has changed significantly over time. Most recently, 
powerful distant-water fishing nations have gained political influence 
over island states’ sovereignty within regional organisations. Distant-
water fleets use this political influence to provide an advantage to their 
commercial fishing operations in the region, not to ensure resource 
sustainability or economic development in Pacific island countries. 
Historical Background
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean provides more than half of 
the global supply of tuna. While tuna fishing was only of marginal 
importance in 1970, it had emerged as a large lucrative business by the 
1980s and has continued as such into the 2000s. Vessel owners now sell 
their tuna catch for over US$ 3 billion per year. 
By 2005, the combined catch of ‘longline’ and ‘purse seine’ fishing was 
almost 1.8 million metric tons (see Table)2.  This represents, however, an 
under-estimate of the total since much of the catch goes unreported. 
Over time, the more capital-intensive method of fishing, ‘purse seining’, 
has overtaken the less capital-intensive method of ‘longlining’ (see 
Table).
Purse seine vessels cast a wall of netting around whole schools of tuna 
while longline vessels deploy central fishing lines that are equipped 
with individual baited hooks. The introduction and expansion of such 
large-scale operations have accelerated not only the economic 
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efficiency of tuna hunting, but also the depletion of tuna stocks in the 
region.
Domestic fishing by Pacific island countries has always been small 
in scale, and the total catch in national waters has normally been 
dominated by large distant-water fleets. Japanese vessels were the first 
such fleets to enter the region in the early 1960s, longlining for tuna on 
an industrial scale to supply the high demand in their home market. 
They expanded into the more capital-intensive and high-yielding purse 
seine fishing in the 1980s and were joined by Taiwanese and other East 
and Southeast Asian distant-water fleets over the next two decades. 
Prior to the early 1980s, fishing was unregulated and access to the 
resource was free of charge. Large-scale tuna fishing by distant-water 
fleets raised fundamental questions about whether small Pacific island 
countries had rights over the fish swimming off their shores as well as 
about whether such practices were sustainable. These countries were 
receiving no compensation from foreign fleets and had no sovereignty 
over tuna resources beyond 12 miles from their shores. 
Asserting Fishing Sovereignty
In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea legally 
recognised the rights of coastal and island states over the marine 
resources that swim within 200 miles of their shores, an area officially 
designated as an ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ (EEZ). Pacific island countries 
used their new rights to license distant-water fishing vessels in exchange 
for the payment of fees.
The islands used forms of South-South inter-state cooperation to enforce 
and maximise fishing fee payments by foreign fleets and to implement 
needed management and reporting practices. These changes 
represented a radical transformation of the tuna fishing business in 
the region. However, fishing fees have remained small, generally never 
exceeding 6% of the value of the catch.
While the Law of the Sea granted Pacific island countries rights over 
tuna resources within their 200-mile zones, this sovereignty came with 
two caveats. First, coastal states were required to cooperate (with each 
other and with foreign fishing interests) to manage the highly migratory 
species. Second, coastal states were required to allow access to distant- 
water fleets if they could not adequately harvest the fisheries themselves 
(the so-called ‘use it or lose it’ clause). Lacking capital to build tuna 
vessels, the Pacific island countries therefore had to allow access to 
Japan, Taiwan and other countries with large fleets.
Progressive Loss of Sovereignty?
After the Law of the Sea, Pacific island countries concluded a succession 
of regional agreements that limited fishing licenses and encouraged 
fishing-related investment in their domestic economies. This elicited 
Tuna Catch Trends in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(1,000 Metric Tons)
Vessel Type 1970 1985 2000 2005
Longline 141 173 224 238
Purse Seine 21 423 1,203 1,559
Combined Total 162 596 1,427 1,797
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an array of responses from distant-water fishing nations and their tuna 
industries.
For example, at first, Japan responded to the increase in Pacific island 
sovereignty by trying to conclude negotiations with individual countries 
in order to harness the best possible terms for its vessels. The Japanese 
government also began informally tying its official aid to fishing access 
agreements with Pacific island countries. But by the 1990s, Japanese 
fishing vessels had begun to face stiff competition from other foreign 
fleets that were able to benefit from lower labour and operating costs. 
In contrast to Japan’s fleet, Taiwan’s fleet began prospering by the 1990s 
due to its use of low-cost Chinese labour, innovative business strategies, 
emphasis on high-yielding purse-seine fishing and ready access to 
finance from large diversified Taiwanese firms. Other fleets also became 
active in the Western and Central Pacific. Increased competition for 
tuna enabled Pacific island states to begin charging moderately higher 
fishing fees. In short, commercial tuna fishing was rapidly expanding.
By 2000, the total tuna catch (both purse seine and longline) had 
reached over 1.4 million metric tons (see Table). However, the overriding 
emphasis of the industry was on expanding commercial operations, 
not conserving tuna resources. As scientific evidence of pending 
resource decline deepened, so did Pacific island state concerns about 
the escalating depletion of their tuna resources and persistently low 
economic returns.
The Process of Regionalisation 
Meanwhile, a 1995 follow-up agreement to the Law of the Sea (the 
UN ‘Fish Stocks’ Agreement) mandated the formation of regional 
organisations to facilitate cooperative management of transboundary 
fishing resources, including tuna. Negotiations beginning in the late 
1990s between the Pacific island states and distant-water fishing nations 
led to the establishment of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission in 2004. The Commission was based on membership by 
both Pacific island countries and distant-water fleet states and was 
tasked with sustainably managing tuna in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean. 
The Commission is a powerful body because it defines total allowable 
catch in the region and dictates how that catch is allocated to fishing 
interests, including determining allocation of fishing rights within Pacific 
island countries’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones. This meant that 
decision-making power had shifted from Pacific island countries alone 
to a UN-mandated international organization, in which richer countries 
had considerably more muscle and resources to apply to negotiations. 
Consequently, the more powerful distant-water fishing countries began 
to gain more influence over the terms, conditions and outcomes of the 
allocation of property rights over the region’s tuna fishery. These nations 
now include countries such as China, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
France, Canada and the United States in addition to Japan and Taiwan.
Distant-water fleets have used the Commission to lobby for their 
interests. Japan and other East Asian countries attempted to advance 
these interests by opposing the joint proposals of Pacific island 
countries. For example, they opposed a critical proposal to reduce the 
catches of bigeye and yellowfin tuna, the two most threatened species 
in the region. This dispute led to a stalemate in the Commission on catch 
limits and the allocation of fishing rights. 
Although Pacific island governments are often blamed for depletion of 
tuna resources within their Exclusive Economic Zones, their negotiating 
power within the Commission has been relatively weak. While 
government representatives have had meagre ad hoc funding to attend 
the negotiating sessions of the Commission, the richer distant-water 
nations have been able to finance large, effective teams of negotiators. 
Moreover, countries such as Japan funded only the participation of 
delegates from Pacific island countries with which they had already 
solidified bilateral fishing access agreements, assuming that this practice 
would strengthen their bargaining position.
Summary
Resource depletion and the lack of tuna-based economic development 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean have not been mainly due—as 
neoliberal discourse has presumed—to Pacific island government 
mismanagement or corruption. Instead,  the source of these problems 
can be traced to the political economy context of modern distant-water 
fishing operations within the structure of an increasingly globalised 
production system. 
Fleets compete for access to tuna and look to their ‘home’ countries 
to support their interests though bilateral arrangements with island 
countries and through securing greater power in regional decision-
making bodies.
Pacific island governments have struggled to maintain regulatory 
control over their tuna resources while the more powerful member 
countries of the Commission have been able to use this international 
body to advance their own national economic agendas. 
Though the Commission has been tasked with addressing overfishing 
and low economic rates of return to Pacific island countries, its regional 
decision-making structure and the commercial interests of foreign fleets 
have begun to erode Pacific island country control over their own tuna 
resources. 
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Footnotes:
1 The complete list is Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.
2 Longline vessels target tuna primarily for consumption as sashimi (raw fish), and purse 
seines primarily for consumption as canned tuna.
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For current developments on 
fisheries trade and regula-
tion, see the Forum Fisheries 
Agency Fisheries Trade News.
